We have outlined a threat risk management strategy, operational concepts that support that strategy, and illustrated some measures of effectiveness for the War on Terror and associated campaigns. These recommendations, while providing genuine direction and efficiency, are not without cost.

Key interest groups will oppose some of these recommendations. Political elements arguing for more troops in Iraq to embarrass the administration will oppose streamlining operations. Within the military, some will oppose tying real measures of effectiveness as "conditions" to force structure, because the MOE could feasibly delay redeployment of some elements according to previously approved timelines. The Time Phased Force Deployment system may not be flexible enough to adapt.

The Joint Staff will have to manage complex MOE for simultaneous, multiple factions (numbering upward of 14 in Iraq alone). While this will not be difficult, simplifying the message for the political echelon will be. The Theater Special Operations Command would have to maintain a wartime-sized staff with heavy reserve augmentation indefinitely. The Theater Special Operations Command would also require a fully staffed Special Operations Liaison Element at the Combined Forces Land Component Command and Combined Forces Air Component Command. These permanent joint billets do not currently exist. GPF commanders would have to willingly subordinate themselves to what they were calling a pitiful sideshow to the main battle a decade ago.

Army Special Forces Groups would see little rest for the weary. The United States Army Special Operations Command, in particular, has been very clear about the risks to the force incurred by overtaxing limited resources. Few Group Commanders will have the ability to manage and optimize a large staff that existed with CJSOTF-North. The SOF community in particular is extremely uncomfortable with media exposure, which, as Lind notes, is an essential part of this battlefield.

On the other hand, the impact of these arguments can be offset. The Joint Staff will have MOE that are not tied to friendly casualties (a MOP) and a clearer set of metrics to judge the progress of the conflict. GPF commanders could rest easier knowing that they were less on the blame line for the success of a form of conflict for which they were not trained or equipped.

The Group Commanders (CJSOTF Commanders) could be given the option to surge from the States as required without a JCS deployment order. The relatively small numbers and equipment of SOF make this feasible. The Group Commander and not the Pentagon would then manage integrated combat, training, and recovery cycles to ensure vital core capabilities were maintained. While managing a large staff would be difficult, CJSOTF Commanders would never need to complain about the inaction of GPF on intelligence. They would have the tools and requirement to act on intelligence developed by their subordinates.

Scarce and reserve-component heavy Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units could be more efficiently used in sustainable numbers, not wasting time on atmospherics in stable communities. The same elements would benefit from having a SOF commander responsible for their logistics support, capable of ensuring their prioritization.

While there are other strategic solutions, few address the reality of a multi-polar battlefield. As Lord Palmerston famously noted, Great Britain has no permanent allies, only permanent interests. A risk reduction strategy takes the long view and ensures that we are concerned to reduce the risk to our objectives created by multinational and non-governmental participation and its effect on our interests. While local commanders rarely want SOF elements in their sectors reporting directly to the strategic commander (it is more difficult to paint a rosy picture), SOF must maintain access to contacts throughout the theater and cede nothing to foreign intelligence services. The construct we have identified creates a viable explanation for a role that also hedges our bets against the time when allied interests diverge. Without a Threat Matrix, we may win the fight against one threat and lose the war to another.

Ultimately, failure to develop and implement a strategy, operational concepts and measures of effectiveness for the War on Terror will give our adaptive enemies a major advantage on the asymmetric battlefield. It will train future military leaders to "avoid Stellenbosch" by making Force Protection the only mission and waiting for other elements of national power to be effective. The military should be able to create a secure environment for diplomatic, informational, economic, and political policies to rapidly succeed. Without such a framework, the military will, instead, have to sustain long-term commitment to a conflict until the other elements of national power create a secure environment indirectly. This gives the threat an objective advantage, pitting our weakness against their strength. Scales notes, "They will seek to win by avoiding loss, to hold on until the Americans tire first. The surest way to win, they have all learned, is to kill Americans..."²³

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23: Scales, P.6. "The inter-disposition of forces in the enemy's midst ensures that we control the clock, not him." By preventing an enemy from massing to gain local superiority, we reduce the significance of the damage his actions can cause. Paradoxically, these smaller positions, supported by firepower and technology, actually reduce threat risk.

David E.A. Johnson, Senior Fellow

Lt. Col. David Johnson is a senior research fellow with the Center for Advanced Defense Studies and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Paris in Theoretical Information Science. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, a Graduate of the Command and General Staff Course, the Joint Defense College (France), and holds a Masters Degree in the History of Strategy from the Sorbonne. An Army Strategist, he has recently served as an Army Legislative Liaison with the House of Representatives, Chief of Plans for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in Northern Iraq and Chief of Plans for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force for the Arabian Peninsula. He is currently assigned as Chief of the Special Operations Theater Support Element-Central Command. His dissertation is in the domain of intention awareness with implications for wireless encryption and the creation of organization independent software. He has participated in numerous working groups for the development of military decision-making systems, both American and French. He has published articles in Infantry and Special Warfare magazines.

This work is posted along the "Fair Use of Copyrighted Works" provisions. This work was originally published by:

The Center for Advanced Defense Studies
The George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052

This work reflects the opinions of the author and not the official positions of The George Washington University, The Department of Defense, or any other organization with which the author is affiliated.

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