Measures of Performance (MOP) are not Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). The simplest way to explain this is that MOP deal with friendly capability and MOE deal with threat capability. For example, placing an Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance platform over the border can be a MOP. Less hostile infiltration is a MOE. Both MOP and MOE are useful. When a commander approaches a decision point, he will examine both as decision criteria. He may need to have medical evacuation capability pre-positioned (MOP) and have hostile spoon rest radar destroyed (MOE), before he commits to launch a force behind enemy lines. This gets vastly more complex on a Fourth Generation Battlefield.

As we can see by the previous example, MOE are tied to an understanding of what makes the threat system function. This is the essential purpose of the intelligence database of initial conditions we described above. In fact, MOE are tied to the things that increase the probability of threat action and the severity of threat damage. So, we need to ensure that our MOE are evaluated in the cyclic threat risk assessment. If we look back at the tables in Figure 2 and 3, we can see that the gradations in each table are MOE. However, some are not easily quantifiable and others may be more appropriate. In fact easily quantifiable MOE and MOP can be dangerous. Just as friendly casualties may not influence our will to continue, so threat casualties may also have little impact. We kill some to influence others.²² It is the influence on capability or intent that we need to measure and not the destruction. We will leave refinement of our example MOE to the planners in the field. The MOE lead to determination of threat risk using the tables in Figures 1-4. Determination of threat risk level, combined with MOP, like transition to Iraqi National Police responsibility, become the conditions for "conditions-based" decisions.

We can push the science of our pseudo-quantification of threat risk only so far. How do we measure a threat constituency or the impact of information operations? We can use standard political opinion polling (a contractor) in stable areas and informal polling by indigenous, civil affairs, and intelligence sources in semi-permissive areas. This will always be marginally accurate. Other MOE will need continual refinement to determine a quantifiable aspect. In the stochastic environment of MOE, perfect accuracy and quantifiability is not possible. Moreover, it is not necessary. As this battlefield approaches the political, it becomes less scientific. Politics is sometimes defined as the Art of the Possible. The political echelons only need to translate some MOE associated with risk reduction into quantifiable results demanded of the Military. This will energize the proactive effort of our commanders and eliminate defensive paralysis.

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22: Leonhard, pg. 225. Objective conflict involves fighting an unlike opponent when and where he is weak. This is opposed to subjective conflict, which involved defeating a like opponent when and where he is strong. Leonard's concept of the Law of Duality is an interesting twist on the idea of asymmetric warfare. He indicates that this is not a new concept at the tactical echelon and that asymmetry, as in objective conflict, can work for us as well as against us.

David E.A. Johnson, Senior Fellow

Lt. Col. David Johnson is a senior research fellow with the Center for Advanced Defense Studies and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Paris in Theoretical Information Science. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, a Graduate of the Command and General Staff Course, the Joint Defense College (France), and holds a Masters Degree in the History of Strategy from the Sorbonne. An Army Strategist, he has recently served as an Army Legislative Liaison with the House of Representatives, Chief of Plans for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in Northern Iraq and Chief of Plans for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force for the Arabian Peninsula. He is currently assigned as Chief of the Special Operations Theater Support Element-Central Command. His dissertation is in the domain of intention awareness with implications for wireless encryption and the creation of organization independent software. He has participated in numerous working groups for the development of military decision-making systems, both American and French. He has published articles in Infantry and Special Warfare magazines.

This work is posted along the "Fair Use of Copyrighted Works" provisions. This work was originally published by:

The Center for Advanced Defense Studies
The George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052

This work reflects the opinions of the author and not the official positions of The George Washington University, The Department of Defense, or any other organization with which the author is affiliated.

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